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Abstract. One of Brian Loar’s most central contributions to contemporary philosophy of 
mind is the notion of phenomenal intentionality: a kind of intentional directedness fully 
grounded in phenomenal character. Proponents of phenomenal intentionality typically also 
endorse the idea of cognitive phenomenology: a sui generis phenomenal character of 
cognitive states such as thoughts and judgments that grounds these states’ intentional 
directedness. This combination creates a challenge, though: namely, how to account for 
the manifest phenomenological difference between perception and cognition. In this 
paper, I argue that there is in fact no obvious account of this difference. I consider three 
main approaches: in terms of high-level vs. low-level contents, of conceptual vs. 
nonconceptual content, and of propositional vs. objectual content. After arguing against 
each, I conclude by considering the phenomenal-intentionalist’s options moving forward. 
 
1  Introduction: Phenomenal Intentionality and Cognitive 
Phenomenology 
 
There is a line of thought, at one time almost orthodox, that divides the mind-body 
problem into two parts: the problem of consciousness and the problem of 
intentionality. The problem of consciousness concerns how to fit into physical reality 
the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences, bodily sensations, and other 
paradigmatically phenomenal states. The problem of intentionality concerns how to fit 
into physical reality the intentional directedness of belief, desire, and other 
propositional attitudes – paradigmatically intentional states.  
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 Radical versions of this line of thought take phenomenal character and 
intentional directedness to have non-overlapping extensions: mental states divide into 
phenomenal and non-intentional states such as feeling ticklish and intentional but non-
phenomenal states such as thinking that the weather is nice. This is what Horgan and 
Tienson (2002) have called “separatism.”1 These specially radical versions go beyond 
the basic idea I want to focus on here, which may be formulated as follows: 
phenomenal character and intentional directedness are ontologically independent 
features. (This can be the case even if phenomenality and intentionality are perfectly 
coextensive.) What this means depends on one’s approach to ontological 
(in)dependence. On a traditional modal approach, it means that for any determinate 
phenomenal character and intentional content, it is possible for a mental state to 
exhibit the former without the latter and vice versa. On the newfangled ground-
theoretic approach, it means that intentional content is never exhibited by a mental 
state in virtue of that state’s phenomenal character, and vice versa.  
 The mutual ontological independence of phenomenality and intentionality has 
recently come under attack from two directions. One view, often referred to 
“representationalism” (see Dretske 1995), holds that intentional content grounds 
phenomenal character; or perhaps more precisely, that there is a kind of intentional 
content such that phenomenal character is grounded in it. Another view, often referred 
to as the “phenomenal intentionality view” (see Loar 1987 for an early statement of the 
basic idea and Loar 2003 for the term “phenomenal intentionality”), holds that 
phenomenal character grounds intentional content; or perhaps more cautiously, that 
there is a kind of intentional content such that phenomenal character grounds it. The 
idea is that purely in virtue of its phenomenal character, and without need of 
interpretation, a perceptual experience as of a red square to the right and a blue circle 
to the left, say, has accuracy conditions, hence a kind of intentional content (Siewert 
1998). 
 The core difference between representationalism and the phenomenal 
intentionality view (henceforth, PIV) pertains to the direction of grounding: 
representationalism holds that phenomenal character is had in virtue of (the right kind 
of) intentional content, PIV that (the right kind of) intentional content is had in virtue of 
phenomenal character. There is also a more ancillary difference, which does not quite 
fall out of these views but does seem to be a robust and natural accompaniment. This 
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concerns the question of whether conscious thoughts, judgments, and other 
propositional attitudes exhibit a kind of sui generis phenomenal character that does 
not simply derive from the phenomenal character of inner speech, visual imagery, and 
the like sensory phenomena. At a purely sociological level, it seems that 
representationalists have not on the whole embraced this idea of a proprietary 
“cognitive phenomenology,” whereas proponents of PIV almost universally have 
(Strawson 1994, 2011, Siewert 1998, 2011, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Pitt 2004, Bayne 
and Montague 2011, Chudnoff 2015, Kriegel 2015, Bourget 2017, Montague 2017). It 
is a fair question why this sociological alignment is so tight, but from a neutral 
standpoint, the following makes sense: if perceptual states’ intentional content is not a 
primitive feature but is grounded in something, and cognitive states have a similar kind 
of intentional content, then we should expect the intentional content of cognitive 
states to be non-primitive as well, and indeed to be grounded in the same kind of 
thing the content of perceptual states is. So if one holds that the perceptual states’ 
intentional content is grounded in their phenomenal character, one is naturally led to 
hold that the intentional content of (conscious) cognitive states is grounded in their 
own phenomenal character.  
 This combination does produce a special challenge, however: that of accounting 
for the evident difference between the phenomenal characters of conscious perception 
and cognition. For someone who holds that perceptual experiences are phenomenal 
but not intentional and cognitive states are intentional but not phenomenal, there is a 
simple and clear line of demarcation here. But for someone who holds that both 
perceptual experiences and conscious thoughts exhibit phenomenal intentionality, 
something else must be said to account for the manifest difference between the two. 
Perhaps the answer is that perceptual and cognitive states simply exhibit different kinds 
of phenomenal intentionality. But the question is how to give an informative account of 
the difference between the phenomenal intentionality characteristic of perceptual 
experience and the phenomenal intentionality characteristic of conscious thought.  
Compare a perceptual experience of a brown dog and a conscious thought 
about a brown dog. (Note well: by “conscious thought” I mean not a visual image of a 
brown dog, but a properly intellectual state.) The untutored introspective impression is 
that there is a clear experiential difference between the two. Moreover, it seems that, 
at least in normal circumstances, we can easily tell whether our current brown-dog-
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representing conscious state is a perceptual experience or a thought. The natural 
explanation is that we do so by picking up on the phenomenal character of our brown-
dog-representing conscious state – picking up, that is, on whether it is a perceptual or 
a cognitive phenomenal character.  
At one level, the difference between perceptual and cognitive phenomenology 
is straightforward. The question is how to capture this difference in a literal and 
informative manner. We might say, for instance, that in perception objects are directly 
present to us, whereas in thought they are not; or that perception presents its objects, 
whereas thought merely re-presents them. Husserl seems to hit the nail on the head 
when he says that while perceptual experiences present their objects in the flesh (‘in 
persona,’ he writes), thoughts do not. But what do such formulations exactly mean? 
Our problem is how to get underneath such suggestive expressions and provide a 
substantive, informative account of the difference between the phenomenal 
intentionality of perception and that of thought. Given that the difference between 
perception and thought is such a bright a line within the field of conscious phenomena, 
addressing this challenge ought to be one of the central items on the agenda of the 
phenomenal intentionality research program. 
In the 1970s and 80s, many sophisticated accounts of the perception/cognition 
divide were offered by philosophers and psychologists. But these tended to draw the 
distinction in terms of subpersonal or architectural features that do not seem 
phenomenally manifest – whereas what PIV needs is precisely a phenomenally manifest 
difference between the two. Consider the notion that perceptual processes are 
‘modular’ whereas cognitive ones are ‘central.’ Fodor (1983) adduced nine features 
distinguishing modular from central states, most prominently domain-specificity, 
informational encapsulation, and fixed neural implementation. However, Fodor did not 
intend any of these to be in any way associated with phenomenal character, and they 
certainly do not seem to be. But for the phenomenal intentionality fan who accepts 
cognitive phenomenology, there should also be a purely phenomenal, first-personally 
appreciable difference between the two. This first-personally appreciable difference 
could – indeed, probably is – grounded in some difference at the level of subpersonal 
mechanism; but the question before us concerns the nature of the phenomenal 
difference thus grounded, not the nature of the underlying mechanistic difference. 
Thus our question can be seen as transforming the old problem of drawing the 
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perception/cognition divide from a problem about kinds of subpersonal architecture to 
a problem about kinds of phenomenal intentionality.  
 What I will argue is that there is in fact no easy way to do this. I will consider 
three main types of approach (each branching into a number of subtypes): that the key 
difference is between perception’s low-level contents and thought’s high-level contents 
(§2); that it is the difference between nonconceptual and conceptual content (§3); that 
it is the difference between an ‘objectual’ and a propositional content (§4). I will 
conclude that none of these works, and will consider PIV’s options for where to go from 
there (§5).  
Before starting, two housekeeping comments. First, I will use the expressions 
‘cognition’ and ‘thought’ interchangeably, and have in mind the exercise of the 
characteristically intellectual capacities involved in conceptual thought, judgment, 
reflection, and so on. There is a use of the term ‘cognition’ that makes it considerably 
wider, covering mental imagery, episodic memory, and any other stimulus-
independent mental phenomena (see Phillips forthcoming). There is even a use of 
‘cognitive’ where it means essentially the same as ‘mental’ (see under: ‘cognitive 
science’). I will not be using the term ‘cognitive’ in these more extended senses, 
because that is not the sense relevant to the phenomenology of thought, judgment, 
and other cognitive states. Secondly, I will use the locution ‘thinking about’ to cover 
both thinking-that and thinking-of. The locution ‘thinking that’ tends to figure in reports 
of mental states that take a stand on the truth of that-which-is-thought, such as 
judgment, belief, and perhaps acceptance. In contrast, the locution ‘thinking of’ tends 
to figure instead in reports of mental states that do not take a stand on the question of 
truth, such as considering, entertaining, or contemplating something. Since the 
difference between the two will not matter to us here, I will usually use the locution 
‘thinking about,’ which seems to me neutral between the two.2  
 
2  Low-Level vs. High-Level Contents 
 
A straightforward approach to the difference between the phenomenal intentionalities 
of perception and thought is to claim that perception and thought simply represent 
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different things. In particular, it might be suggested, perception represents low-level 
properties, such as color and shape, whereas thought represents high-level properties, 
such as being a Labrador and being illegal.  
 Setting aside debates over whether perception might represent some high-level 
properties as well (Siegel 2010), the main problem here is that thought can clearly 
represent low-level properties. You can see red, but you can also think about red; you 
can smell the odor of freshly ground coffee, but you can also think about it. Again, by 
this I mean not just that you can imagine that color and that odor. I mean that you can 
also form judgments about them. Indeed, it is commonly thought that one way we can 
form judgments or beliefs is simply by endorsing our perceptual experiences. If I seem 
to see that there is a red triangle in front of me, and take at face value my visual 
experience – i.e., endorse it – I thereby form a judgment that there is a red triangle in 
front of me. The result is a cognitive state that represents the same low-level properties 
that the visual experience did. 
 It is true, of course, that there is still this general difference between thought 
and perception: thought can represent some properties that perception cannot. It is 
possible to think that virtue is its own reward, but impossible to smell or see anything 
of the sort. However, this does not help us to distinguish a dated token perceptual 
experience of a red triangle from a dated token thought about a red triangle. It may 
help us distinguish the faculties of perception and thought (if there are such things), or 
the natural kinds Perceptions and Thoughts (ditto). But given an individual perceptual 
experience of some sensible entity and an individual thought formed by mere 
endorsement of that perceptual experience, the two will represent the same (low-level) 
properties.3 
 Might someone insist that, in fact, the redness-related properties represented in 
perception and in thought are not exactly the same? This is certainly a coherent option. 
Perhaps the claim could be that perception represents apparent redness (understood 
as a property of external objects – see Shoemaker 1994, Egan 2006), whereas thought 
represents real redness. One problem with this strategy is that we are left with no 
obvious way to account for the apparent possibility of forming thoughts via 
endorsement, since the properties represented by color perceptions and color 
thoughts are systematically different. But more deeply, it is unclear what prevents me 
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from thinking about whatever feature I am currently visually aware of – if only under 
that description.  
This suggests that the real issue here cannot be what property is being 
represented, but how it is represented. Thus, just as one may have two concepts for 
Venus, a Phosphorescent concept and a Hesperescent concept, one may also have two 
concepts of red, a perceptual concept and a cognitive concept. It might be suggested, 
then, that a perceptual experience of a red triangle deploys perceptual concepts of 
redness and triangularity, while a conscious thought about a red triangle deploys 
cognitive concepts of redness and triangularity. 
Put this way, the account is not particularly illuminating. All it does is pass the 
buck from the difference between perceptual and cognitive states to the difference 
between perceptual and cognitive concepts. This does not quite advance our 
understanding of the essential difference between the perceptual and the cognitive; it 
only shifts the locus of the distinction from the realm of states to that of concepts.  
The phenomenal intentionalist may, of course, attempt to offer a more 
informative account of the distinction between perceptual and cognitive concepts. 
However, it is important to stress that such an account could not appeal to sub-
personal or unconscious phenomena that are not manifest in the phenomenology. For 
what we are trying to account for is the difference between perceptual and cognitive 
phenomenology. Thus an account in terms of difference between the functional or 
inferential roles of perceptual and cognitive concepts would be problematic: on the 
face of it, functional/inferential role is a dispositional property, whereas phenomenal 
character is occurrent.  
Furthermore, whatever account of the difference between perceptual and 
cognitive concepts the phenomenal intentionalist offers, the notion that this is what 
explains the phenomenal difference between perception and thought has the 
unfortunate consequence that thoughts can never be formed by endorsement, that is, 
by taking at face value certain perceptual experiences. Suppose you see a red triangle 
before you, and then think that there is a red triangle before you. Your perception will 
have a content C, featuring as constituent the perceptual concept of red, whereas your 
thought will have a different content C*, featuring as constituent a cognitive concept of 
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red. Thus the formation of thoughts by simple endorsement of perceptual experiences 
becomes mysterious.  
For all these reasons, it seems unlikely that the phenomenal difference between 
perception and thought comes down to the difference between representing low-level 
vs. high-level properties, or to the difference between low-level vs. high-level concepts 
used to represent properties.  
The phenomenal intentionalist might then suggest that the difference between a 
perceptual way and a cognitive way of representing red goes deeper than the use of 
different concepts. In fact, she might suggest, the perceptual way represents without 
the use of concepts at all, whereas the cognitive way is conceptual. Let us consider this 
approach next.   
 
3  Nonconceptual vs. Conceptual Content 
 
The notion that perception has nonconceptual content whereas thought has 
conceptual content is widely held among representationalists (Dretske 1995, Tye 1995). 
There is no reason why PIV cannot avail itself of the same idea. On this view, a 
perception and a thought may both represent red, but the cognitive representation 
deploys the concept RED, whereas the perceptual representation does not.  
 One immediate issue in evaluating this suggestion is the absence of any 
consensus on what the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction exactly amounts to. The 
variety of theories in this area is bewildering, but broadly speaking, there are two 
general ways to construe the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction (Heck 2000). On 
the content-based distinction, a conceptual representation of a brown dog has a 
content of which both the concept BROWN and the concept DOG are constituents; a 
nonconceptual representation of a brown dog has a categorically distinct kind of 
content, one that does not have concepts for constituents (more on this in §3.2). On 
the state-based distinction, a conceptual representation of a brown dog is a 
representational state a subject cannot be in unless she possesses the concepts BROWN 
and DOG; a nonconceptual representation is a representational state the subject can be 
in even if she does not possess BROWN and DOG.  
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 It is commonly agreed (see Byrne 2005, Speaks 2005, Heck 2007) that in 
relevant discussions, the state-based distinction has been more central. Accordingly, I 
start by considering using that distinction to capture the phenomenal difference 
between perception and thought (§3.1); then I consider using the content-based 
distinction (§3.2).  
 
3.1. Perception, Cognition, and the state-based conception of (non)concceptuality 
If we use the state-based distinction, the suggestion becomes effectively this: a 
perceptual experience of a brown dog is a phenomenal-intentional state we can be in 
even if we do not possess the concepts BROWN and DOG; an occurrent thought about a 
brown dog is a phenomenal-intentional state we cannot be in unless we possess 
BROWN and DOG. Certainly among representationalists this seems to me the most 
common approach to the difference between conscious perception on the one hand 
and cognition on the other; this is explicit in Tye’s (1995) PANIC theory, and implicit in 
Dretske’s (1981) notion that perception employs an analog format whereas thought 
employs a digital format. The idea is that perception presents us what it does in a 
much finer-grained fashion than thought does, as our capacities for perceptual 
discrimination typically far outstrip the concepts we possess, so our perceptual 
awareness can capture details that thought cannot.  
This approach seems initially promising, by my view is that its allure is due to 
purely contingent facts about human perception and thought that shed no light on the 
deep natures of perception and thought. To show this, let me present a two-step 
objection.  
The first step is to note that failure to possess a concept for feature F is not a 
necessary condition for having a perceptual experience of F. Imagine a creature whose 
visual field is a perfect square (say, because of the peculiar shape of its visual organs) 
and who has a visual experience of a pure white Ganzfeld. The only features she is 
visually experiencing are thus the color white and perhaps the shape square – two 
features for which most of us, and, let us stipulate, this creature, do possess the 
concepts. It would be odd to suppose that as soon as this creature acquires the 
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concepts WHITE and SQUARE, she loses the ability to have a visual experience when 
standing in front of a uniformly white wall.  
Indeed, we can also conceive of a supersentient creature who, amazingly, 
possesses a concept for every shade of red and every polygon up to the megagon (the 
million-sided polygon). Call this creature Lynceus (after the Greek god of whom he 
reminds). Lynceus can discriminate red273 from red274, recognize a sample as red273 a 
year after first seeing it, and draw appropriate inferences about red273 objects. Some 
philosophers hold that such capacities are constitutive of possessing the concept RED273, 
others that they are merely evidence of possessing it; I do not take a stand on this here, 
but I stipulate that Lynceus possesses both the capacities and the concept. Imagine 
now that Lynceus is presented with a red273 chiliagon. It would be perverse to say that 
Lynceus cannot perceptually experience the red273 chiliagon (can only think about it) 
because of his increased perceptual acuity and processing power. From this 
perspective, it seems to be a merely contingent fact about us that we fail to possess 
concepts for some features we can perceive; it is not in the nature of perception to 
outstrip the perceiving subject’s conceptual repertoire. 
 There is an objection to this reasoning, which invites the promised second step. 
The objection is that the state-based conception of non-conceptuality does not require 
a perceptual experience to outstrip our conceptual repertoire; all it says is that a 
nonconceptual state is one that the subject can be in even if she does not possess the 
relevant concepts. And although Lynceus possesses the concepts CHILIAGON and RED273, 
the perceptual state he is in when presented with a red273 chiliagon is one he could be 
in even if he failed to possess those concepts. That is, although in the world we just 
envisaged Lynceus possesses both CHILIAGON and RED273, there is another world W 
where (i) Lynceus does not possess the concepts CHILIAGON and RED273, but (ii) Lynceus 
is in the same mental state.4  
 The second step of the problem starts from granting that there is a world like W. 
But its existence raises the following question: What makes it the case that Lynceus’ 
mental state in W is the same as (type-identical to) the state in which he is in the world 
we originally envisaged (the world where he does possess CHILIAGON and RED273)? In 
particular, what makes it the case that in both worlds it is a perceptual state – as 
opposed to being a perceptual state in W and a cognitive state in the originally 
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envisaged world? If Lynceus’ state is perceptual even in the world in which Lynceus 
possesses the concepts CHILIAGON and RED273, what makes it the case that it is 
perceptual? However one answers this question, the answer will effectively preempt 
nonconceptuality as the criterion for perceptuality. In other words, the assumption that 
Lynceus can have perceptual experiences of F both in worlds where he possesses the 
concept of F and in worlds where he does not presupposes that there is some feature, 
more basic than concept-possession, that accounts for the perceptuality of a conscious 
state.  
For example, suppose one said this: the reason Lynceus’ state is the same in 
(type-identical across) both worlds, and therefore is a perceptual state even in the 
world where Lynceus possesses the concepts CHILIAGON and RED273, is that in both 
worlds it represents low-level properties (colors and shapes). Then one’s defense of the 
conceptual/nonconceptual account of the difference between perception and thought 
presupposes the low-level/high-level account. The latter is in a sense one’s real 
account. Now, the fact that we have already argued against the low-level/high-level 
account is not what matters to me here. What matters is the fact that the 
conceptual/nonconceptual account cannot stand on its own, given the possibility of 
creatures like Lynceus. It must rely on a more fundamental account.5 
The upshot is that once we admit that a mental representation of F can be 
perceptual despite the subject possessing the concept of F, there must be some 
deeper reason for its status as perceptual (as opposed to cognitive) than 
nonconceptuality understood in the state-based way. The difference between the 
conceptual and the nonconceptual can no longer be the ultimate difference between 
perception and cognition. 
 
3.2. Perception, Cognition, and the content-based conception of (non)concceptuality 
The content-based distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content 
generates the following view: a conscious thought that the dog is brown has for 
content a structured proposition whose constituents include the concepts DOG and 
BROWN; a perceptual experience of the dog being brown has for content a categorically 
different kind of entity. What categorically different entity? Well, there are three 
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importantly different alternatives to a structured proposition whose constituents are 
concepts: (a) a structured proposition whose constituents are not concepts; (b) an 
unstructured proposition; (c) an entity other than a proposition. Each may be plugged 
into a content-based attempt to capture the phenomenal difference between 
perception and thought in terms of (non)conceptuality.  
 Option (a) holds that while the conscious thought that the dog is brown has for 
content the structured proposition whose constituents include DOG and BROWN, the 
corresponding perceptual experience has for content a similar structure, but featuring 
as constituents not the concepts DOG and BROWN, but some nonconceptual analogs 
thereof – perhaps the nonconceptual modes of presentation DOG and BROWN.  
 An immediate worry here is that it is far from clear what modes of presentation 
exactly are. If they are constituents of proposition-like structures, and these structures 
are abstract entities, then presumably they are themselves abstract entities, though not 
quite the same abstract entities that concepts are. But we really know next to nothing 
else about the kind of things they are.  
 More worryingly, from our perspective, the difference between the abstract 
structures <BROWN + DOG> and <BROWN + DOG> does not seem to be of the right kind 
to capture the phenomenal difference between perception and thought.6 For it is hard 
to see how the difference between those two structures could deliver the difference 
between presentation of a brown dog in the flesh and presentation of the same dog 
not in the flesh. What is it about the abstract structure <BROWN + DOG> that makes the 
dog present to us in the flesh? Just invoking that abstract structure and distinguishing it 
from the conceptual abstract structure <BROWN + DOG> does not get us any closer to 
answering that question. We can, of course, simply use the expression ‘nonconceptual 
mode of presentation’ as a label for presentation-in-the-flesh. But if this is all we are 
doing, we are offering nothing that gets underneath the observation that perceptual 
experiences have the kind of content that presents in the flesh while conscious 
thoughts have the kind of content that does not. We are renaming the explanandum, 
not explaining it. 
 Alternative (b) is worse still. The idea here is that when we speak of the 
proposition <the dog is brown>, there are really two distinct entities we may be 
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referring to: (i) a structured proposition with conceptual constituents and (ii) an 
unstructured proposition. Perceptual experience of the dog being brown carries (ii), 
conscious thinking about the dog being brown carries (i). I should stress that nobody in 
the literature has ever proposed this; I am considering this possibility merely for the 
sake of exhaustiveness.  
The view obviously indulges an extravagant ontology of propositions. We need 
not endorse a general principle of ‘explanatory closure of the concrete realm’ (Kriegel 
2011) to feel uncomfortable about positing all those different denizens of the Platonic 
heaven just to account for the concrete phenomenal difference between seeing a 
brown dog and thinking about a brown dog. Furthermore, it is hard to see how this 
view accommodates the idea that we can form a thought simply by endorsing a 
perceptual experience. The view requires endorsement to be a special procedure that 
transubstantiates unstructured propositions into structured ones. In addition, the 
distinction between structured and unstructured propositions seems no more fitted to 
capture the difference between a phenomenology of presenting-in-the-flesh and a 
phenomenology of presenting-not-in-the-flesh than the distinction between 
propositions composed of concepts and propositional structures composed of 
nonconceptual modes of presentation. These distinctions just do not seem to have the 
right shape to capture the distinctively in-the-flesh character of perceptual presentation. 
To my mind, alternative (c) is the most promising. Here the idea is that while the 
thought content <the dog is brown> features a constituent structure with concepts as 
building blocks, perceptual content does not consist in the proposition <the dog is 
brown> at all, nor any other proposition, conceived of either as unstructured or as 
structured out of nonconceptual ingredients. Instead it involves a non-propositional 
content.  
What exactly is non-propositional content? The natural thought is that 
perceptual experience has objectual content, somewhat as love and fear are often 
claimed to do (Forbes 2000, Montague 2007). Intuitively, loving one’s child is 
irreducible to loving that p for any p. And likewise, one might plausibly suspect, seeing 
a brown dog is irreducible to seeing that p for any p. Using chevrons to designate 
contents, whether propositional or not, we might say that while the thought has 
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content of the form <the dog is brown>, the corresponding perceptual experience has 
content of the irreducibly objectual form <brown dog>. We consider this option next. 
 
4  Objectual vs. Propositional Content 
 
In truth, the propositional/objectual distinction can be interpreted either as a 
distinction concerning what is represented or as a distinction concerning how what is 
represented is represented. However, the former leads to an implausible account of 
the perception/cognition divide. It leads to the notion that while perceptions represent 
objects, thoughts represent propositions. Now, if the idea is that thoughts represent 
Russellian propositions – essentially, states of affairs – then it is not clear why 
perception should be incapable of doing the same. Looking at a red rectangle, I see 
not only the rectangle but also its redness. What I cannot see are rather Fregean 
propositions, understood as non-spatial, abstract structured entities inhabiting ‘the 
third realm.’ These are plausibly invisible, and more generally imperceptible. However, 
Fregean propositions make equally poor candidates for what thoughts represents – for 
that-which-thoughts-are-about. When I think that Max is a Labrador, that which I am 
thinking about is the specific dog Max and the kind of dog he is, not some shapeless 
and colorless counterpart of Max in the ‘third realm.’ The point becomes even more 
salient when we consider other propositional attitudes, such as desire. When you 
desire that your mother be happy, what you desire involves your actual mother; the 
fate of some corresponding abstractum is none of your concern. This is not to say that 
Fregean propositions have no role to play in the theory of propositional attitudes, 
including thoughts. Hesperus/Phosphorus phenomena suggest that they rather do. But 
the relevant role is not that of capturing that-which-is-thought-about. 
The other interpretation of the propositional/objectual distinction allows that a 
perceptual experience and a thought may represent the same state of affairs – say, 
some rectangle’s being red – but represent it differently. In particular, the thought 
involves a propositionally structured way of representing that state of affairs, whereby 
the redness is predicated of the rectangle, whereas the perception represents the state 
of affairs in a pre-predicative way, as an unstructured whole so to speak. We might 
write: the thought represents the rectangle’s being red, whereas the perceptual 
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experience represents the rectangle’s-being-red (where the hyphens signal that ‘red’ is 
a not a syntactic, but only a morphological, part of ‘rectangle’s-being-red’). 
In this form, this seems to me the most promising of the PIV approaches we 
have discussed. It is a natural thought that what distinguishes merely sentient creatures 
from sapient ones is the latter’s ability to ‘put together’ ideas (the intellect’s ‘power of 
synthesis’) in the way characteristic of predication. Nonetheless, several considerations 
should worry us about the view’s ultimate plausibility. I will present these as a series of 
queries to the view’s proponent. I do not rule out that a satisfactory answer could be 
given to all of them, but going through them will bring out the tall order facing the 
view. 
First of all: Is it so obvious that no perception has predicative content? Folk 
psychology certainly makes allowances not only for objectual perceptual reports, such 
as ‘He sees a brown table,’ but also propositional perceptual reports, such as ‘She sees 
that the table is brown’ (‘She hears that the mailman has arrived,’ ‘She smells that the 
coffee is ready,’ etc.). The latter ostensibly report predicative states. It might be 
retorted that the mental states reported in such constructions can be neatly factorized 
into two components, a purely perceptual one that is pre-predicative and a fully 
cognitive one that is predicative. But showing that this is so is very hard. The challenge 
is put very clearly by Søren Klausen: 
Seeing that the rose is red is quite different from simultaneously seeing a red rose and thinking 
that a rose is red… [If perceiving-that] consisted of two distinct intentional states, there could be 
a genuine question about whether one was in fact thinking of the rose which one also happened 
to see. (Klausen 2008: 453) 
When you perceive that the table is brown, there seem to be no possible daylight 
between the table you perceive and the table of which brownness is predicated. But 
such daylight would be possible if the factorizing strategy were correct.  
 Secondly, there is a converse question, albeit perhaps less pressing: Might there 
not be objectual cognitive attitudes? Folk psychology does make use of belief-in 
reports, wherein the psychological verb takes an objectual complement (as in ‘Junior 
believes in Santa Claus’). Now, the obvious response here is that ‘belief-in’ reports are 
at bottom just lackadaisical ways of reporting existential beliefs-that: when we say that 
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S believes in ghosts, all we mean is that S believes that there are ghosts. Nonetheless, 
some philosophers have explicitly argued against this analysis, claiming that at least 
some belief-in reports resist paraphrase into belief-that reports (Szabó 2003, Textor 
2007, as well as Brentano 1874). 
Third: Is the difference between a structured and an unstructured representation 
of a state of affairs a phenomenally manifest difference? A phenomenal difference is 
one that we might reasonably expect to be able to pick up on by the use of 
introspection, at least in favorable circumstances and given the right ‘phenomenal 
contrasts.’ If, using the right phenomenal contrasts and being sufficiently attentive, we 
could pick up on a subtle but phenomenally real act of predication that is built into our 
thoughts but is absent from our perceptual experiences, that would constitute 
important evidence for the account under consideration. But to my knowledge, no 
such evidence has been provided to date.  
Fourth: Granting that perceptual phenomenology lacks a predicative dimension 
presenting in cognitive phenomenology, could this difference really exhaust the 
difference between the two types of phenomenology? A reason for skepticism is that 
that would again constitute a merely negative characterization of perceptual 
phenomenology. When a naïve subject ‘tells’ introspectively that she is having a 
perceptual experience of a brown dog, rather than a thought about a brown dog, she 
seems to pick up on something positive that is present in her conscious state, not just 
on some absence. 
Finally, and relatedly: Is the difference between predicative and pre-predicative 
content the right kind of difference to capture the phenomenal difference between 
thought and perception? It is unclear why and how the absence of a predicative 
structuring of one’s representation of something would ‘spark into life’ all those colors 
and sounds, nor why the presence of such predicative structuring make them fade 
away. It is hard to see the connection between the distinctive in-the-flesh character of 
perceptual awareness and predication.  
 
5  Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here?  
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If none of the aforementioned accounts of the phenomenally manifest difference 
between perception and thought is satisfactory, what are our options?  
 The most optimistic option is to hope that some other PIV account will be more 
successful than those we have considered here. Obviously, I have not considered every 
possible PIV account, and one of them might just work. This is of course possible, but 
would have to be shown.  
 Another option is to go primitivist. The idea is that there is a difference between 
perceptual phenomenal-intentional content and cognitive phenomenal-intentional 
content, but there is no way to get underneath that difference. We can use various 
metaphors, such as ‘presenting in the flesh,’ to make the difference vivid, but we 
cannot hope to offer any substantive account of the difference. Such primitivist moves 
are of course always available, and sometimes they are true; but always they are less 
theoretically satisfying than substantive accounts.  
 A more desperate option is to deny the datum. This could take the form of 
either (a) denying that there is a difference between perceptual phenomenology and 
cognitive phenomenology or (b) denying that there is a proprietary cognitive 
phenomenology to begin with. That is, even if perceptual experience has phenomenal 
intentionality, thought does not. Personally, both options strike me as frankly 
unbelievable, though I am aware that I have provided no argument against them. 
 A different way forward is to drop the claim that there is a difference between 
perception and thought at the level of phenomenal-intentional content, but insist that 
there is still a phenomenal-intentional difference, namely at the level of attitude or 
mode. The idea is to posit a cognitive experiential modality alongside the perceptual 
modalities (or, alternatively, a plethora of cognitive modalities, perhaps corresponding 
to cognitive propositional attitudes that can be conscious – judging that p, accepting 
that p, suspecting that p, conjecturing that p, etc.). Underlying this move is the thought 
that phenomenal intentionality is really a two-faceted phenomenon, in which content is 
only one facet and another facet is attitude. On this view, attitudes are just as 
phenomenally manifest as contents, and a conception of phenomenal intentionality 
which does not take them into account is perforce incomplete (Horgan and Tienson 
2002: 522, Kriegel forthcoming §2). I find this the most natural lesson to draw from this 
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paper’s discussion. However, in a companion piece (Kriegel 2018), I argue against a 
number of attitude-based approaches to the phenomenal difference between 
perception and thought. 
 Obviously, there is one last way forward here, which is to give up on the 
phenomenal intentionality view, on the grounds that it is unable to account for the 
phenomenally manifest difference between perception and thought. This seems to me 
an overreaction, however: I would sooner adopt a primitivist account of the difference 
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1 A particularly radical version, propounded for instance by Rorty (1967), sees “the mental” as a 
hodgepodge category that forces together all states that happen to exhibit either 
phenomenality or intentionality, though these have intrinsically little to do with each other. 
 
2 On the one hand, ‘thinking about’ can be used to report a thought of an object, or even a 
proposition, in a contemplative mode. Thus, when we say ‘Jimmy is thinking about the 
proposition that the weather is nice,’ we do not mean to imply that Jimmy takes it to be true 
that the weather is nice. On the other hand, we can use the ‘think about’ locution to report a 
part of a more committal belief-like state. Thus, if Jimmy judges consciously that the weather is 
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nice, we can say – correctly – that Jimmy is thinking about the weather, or even that he is 
thinking about the weather being nice. 
 
3 It might be suggested that if the possibility of representing (sufficiently) high-level properties 
is admitted to distinguish the faculties of perception and thought, then we could always 
propose that perceptual experiences are the products of the perceptual faculty whereas 
thoughts are the products of the faculty of thought. But the problem is that being-produced-
by-faculty-F does not seem like a phenomenal property, the kind of property that could 
distinguish perceptual from cognitive phenomenology.  
 
4 There is a related but more superficial objection, according to which even if the Lyncean 
creature possesses the concept CHILIAGON, it may not deploy that concept when merely 
perceiving a chiliagon. To this it could be responded that it is quite hard to refrain from 
applying a fitting concept one possesses and knows to be fitting (try to see your mother’s face 
not as your mother’s face!), and in any case we can stipulate that on occasion the creature fails 
to refrain from automatically applying the concepts. I think the objector will insist here that 
even if the creature always applies the concept CHILIAGON as soon as she perceives a chiliagon, 
the two things are logically separate. But what this means, really, is that the creature could 
have had the same perceptual experience without applying or even possessing the relevant 
concepts. Thus the objection we are considering in the main text ultimately underlies the 
objection just raised. If we can respond to the one, we can respond to the other. 
 
5 By the way, the worst answer we could give to the question ‘What makes it the same mental 
state, perceptual in both cases, in both worlds?’ is ‘The phenomenology is the same in both 
worlds, and is rather a perceptual phenomenology.’ For our hope was to use the 
conceptual/nonconceptual distinction to get underneath the distinction between perceptual 
and cognitive phenomenology, a gambit that would be frustrated if defending the 
conceptual/nonconceptual account presupposes a phenomenal difference between perception 
and cognition. 
 
6 The plus sign is supposed to denote what accounts for the ‘unity of the proposition’ – a 
potential can of worms I am setting aside here. 
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